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Abstract 
The Japanese government has amassed a huge amount of gross public debts over the past several decades. However, 
previous empirical works dealing with vector auto-regression (VAR) have not considered the effect of debt on fiscal 
policy and the macro economy. In this paper, we incorporate debt dynamics in a VAR model in the spirit of Favero 
and Giavazzi (2007, 2011). The inclusion of the debt feedback rule in VAR can help overcome the misspecification 
problem and provide direction toward a more relevant debt path and fiscal stance. The main findings of our study are 
as follows. First, in the pre-bubble period, the fiscal authority in Japan increased the primary surplus when the public 
debt level was high. However, this Ricardian behavior was not seen in the post-bubble period. Second, the impulse 
response functions to the expansionary government spending shock reveal that the stance of fiscal policy was more 
active in the pre-bubble. Third, while the forecast of debt dynamics in the pre-bubble period was stable, it became 
explosive in the post-bubble period.
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1 Introduction
From the mid-1970s, govenment debt has been steadily increasing in Japan, thereby depressing
the Japanese economy.1 In the early 1970s, Japan’s government debt for Japan was maintained
at less than twenty percent of the annual GDP. However, since then, the debt stocks have surged
to more than 200 percent in 2009. The rising debts may limit the effect of the government’s
expansionary policy to stimulate the stumbling economy.
A number of empirical works have investigated the effect of ﬁscal policy shocks in the
Japanese economy. Many of these studies adopt the VAR methodology to identify a pure ﬁscal
policy shock. For example, Kuttner and Posen (2002), Bayomi (2001), and Ihori and Nakamoto
(2005) analyze the effect of the expansionary ﬁscal policy on macro variables such as GDP and
aggregate consumption. Most of these previous works use Cholesky decomposition to identify
ﬁscal policy shocks. On the other hand, Watanabe, Yabu, and Ito (2011) and Kato (2003) adopt
a Blanchard-Perotti type identiﬁcation scheme: they rely on institutional information about tax
and transfer systems and the timing of tax collections to identify the automatic response of
taxes and government spending to economic activity. Recently, Miyazaki (2010) has followed
the narrative approach introduced by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) to examine the ﬁscal policy
effect during the 1990s. The general inference of these existing works is that an increase in
government expenditure or a cut in government revenues had positive effects on output in the
pre-bubble period, but the government’s expansionary effect was limited in the post-bubble
period.
Through this study, our aim is to analyze the effect of ﬁscal policy in Japan while consider-
ing debt feedback. The stance of ﬁscal policy is important because it reﬂects the future actions
of the government, and the economy is also inﬂuenced by how the market expects the ﬁscal ac-
tions. However, in the previous works with VAR models, the dynamics of public debt were not
explicitly considered in the estimation.2 As discussed in Favero and Giavazzi (2007, 2011), this
may result in a misspeciﬁcation problem and hence, the forecast of the debt path may become
irrelevant. In this paper, we employ the VAR methodology with an explicit inclusion of debt
feedbacks following Favero and Giavazzi (2007, 2011). When estimating the VAR model, we
explicitly incorporate the debt-to-GDP ratio as an explanatory variable. We also consider the
fact that public debt evolves through the government’s inter-temporal budget constraint. Insti-
tutional information was used to identify pure ﬁscal shocks. Following Watanabe et al. (2011),
we split the sample period into pre- and post- bubble periods to discuss the changing pattern of
ﬁscal effects.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. First, in the ﬁrst sample period, from 1970Q1 to 1986Q4,
the ﬁscal authority tried to maintain a positive primary surplus when public debt was at a
high level. However, this phenomenon was not seen in the post-bubble period, from 1987Q1
to 2004Q4. Although Japan is yet to pay back huge debts, the government has adopted the
stance of increasing expenditures and decrease tax revenues. Second, the impulse response
functions to the expansionary government spending shock reveal that the ﬁscal policy stance
in the pre-bubble period was more active in reducing public debts. The government also in-
creased the tax revenues in response to the increase in spending. Despite this negative wealth
1In this paper, government debt refers to the debt of the central and local governments. For the deﬁnition of
debt, see the data section.
2The only exception is Ito, Watanabe, and Yabu (2011). Using the Markov-switching model, they examine
how the ﬁscal authority reacts to the past debt level. However, they do not examine the effect of government
policy on the economy.
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effect on households, Japan has witnessed a signiﬁcant expansion of its GDP. The correspond-
ing debts response shows a decreasing pattern under the expansionary government spending
shocks. However, in the second sub-sample period, the government did not increase taxes.
Moreover, the expansionary effect on GDP was reduced. This is strongly related to debt dy-
namics. Different from the ﬁrst sample period, the response of debt becomes positive in the
short run. This may induce a rather contractionary effect in the economy. However, these
effects are not observed under the no feedback rule speciﬁcation. In both periods, the gov-
ernment does not increase taxes sufﬁciently. Third, under the debt feedback rule, the forecast
of debt dynamics in the pre-bubble period was stable, reﬂecting the government’s Ricardian
behavior. However, in the post-bubble period, the debt path becomes explosive owing to the
government’s failure to stabilize debt. However, the simulated path under the no feedback rule
exhibits a very different sequence: the path is explosive in the pre-bubble period and stable in
the post-bubble period. Thus, we conclude that the explicit inclusion of the feedback rule is
very important to estimate and analyze the effect of ﬁscal policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the Japanese economy
and the Japanese government’s behavior from 1970 to 2004. In Section 3, we describe the
VAR model with debt feedback and our identiﬁcation scheme. In Section 4, we present our
estimation and benchmark results. In Section 5, we conclude our paper.
2 Overview of the Japanese Government’s Expenditure and
Debt
2.1 The intertemporal government budget constraint
The ﬂow government budget constraint on date t can be written as follows:
Dt = (1 + rt)Dt¡1 − St, (1)
where Dt denotes the nominal public debt at the end of date t, rt is the one-period nominal
interest rate to be paid for the existing debt at the beginning of t, and St (≡ Tt − Gt) denotes
the nominal primary surplus where Gt and Tt are the nominal government expenditures and
revenues, respectively.3 When this equation is divided by the nominal GDP, the inter-temporal
government budget constraint becomes
dt = q
¡1
t dt¡1 − st, (2)
where dt is the debt-to-GDP ratio, qt (≡ 1+nt
1+rt) is a discount factor, nt is the nominal growth
rate of GDP, and st is the primary surplus divided by GDP. The current debt-to-GDP ratio now
depends on two terms: the past debt-to-GDP ratio divided by the discount factor and primary
surplus-to-GDP ratio. Thus, the debt-to-GDP ratio is stabilized only when the discount factor
or the primary surplus is sufﬁciently high.
2.2 Economic Performance and Fiscal Policy
In this subsection, we brieﬂy review the ﬁscal policy from the 1970s through the 2000s. Figure
1 displays the government’s and other related variables during this period.
3We assume that the seigniorage revenue is zero because the actual revenue was small.
2
2375Economics Bulletin, 2011, Vol. 31 no.3 pp. 2373-2387
Figure 1: Government’s Behavior and Economic Performance
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Note: The shaded areas indicate periods of economic recession.
Panel A in Figure 1 represents the debt-to-GDP ratio from 1970Q1 to 2004Q4. Since the
mid-1970s, the debt-to-GDP ratio for Japan has seen a consistently increasing trend. The debt-
to-GDP ratio was maintained at 10 to 20 percent of the annual GDP in the early 1970s. How-
ever, since then, the debt-to-GDP ratio has increased steadily except at the peak of the bubble
period in the late 1980s. In particular, after the ushering the 1990s, the so-called “lost decade,”
Japan’s GDP performance was poor despite the huge volume of government spendings. Public
debts ﬁnally exceeded the annual GDP in the late 1990s. In the new millennium, after Japan
3
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had recovered to a certain degree, public debts had increased to almost twice as much as the
GDP in 2004.
PanelBshowstheprimarysurplus-to-GDPratio. Throughoutthesampleperiod, thesurplus-
to-GDP ratio was generally negative owing to the fact that the volume of government expendi-
tures exceeded government revenues, thereby leading to an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
However, its trend between the pre- and post- bubble periods are different. Starting from the
late-1970s, the surplus-to-GDP ratio has shown an increasing pattern until the bubble burst in
1990, but it has shown a decreasing pattern thereafter. This means that authority’s management
became more stringent entering 1990s. In the pre-bubble period, the government revenue was
strictly increasing despite enlarged government spendings. In the post-bubble period, the size
of government expenditures relative to GDP showed a strictly increasing pattern, while the tax
revenues started to show a decreasing pattern in the post-bubble period.
Panels C and D each display the series of the interest rate on public debt payments and the
inﬂation rate of the GDP deﬂator, respectively. Although public debt was skyrocketing, the
interest rate shows an opposite shape. One of the main reasons for this was the stance of the
Bank of Japan. In the mid-1980s, the uncollateralized overnight call rate was lowered to boost
the economy and then increased in the late-1980s. Since 1991, to stimulate the economy, the
Japanese government began lowering the call rate, which declined to 6.25 percent in December
1991, 3.82 in December 1992, 0.4 percent in December 1995, and 0.01 percent in 1999. Other
interest rates, including the long-term Japanese government bond (JGB) yield also followed the
sequence of the call rate.
Panel E plots the discount factor. Equation (2) shows that when the discount factor is low,
the debt burden increases. Except for in the early 1970s and late 1980s, the discount factor has
been less than one. The decreasing pattern of the discount factor in the 1970s and 1980s and
its consistently low level since 1990 may account for some fraction of the increasing pattern of
the debts in both periods.
3 Framework of Analysis
3.1 Traditional VAR with Fiscal Policy
Before the illustration of the VAR model with a feedback rule, we begin with a brief discussion
on a standard VAR model:
Yt = β0,t +
p ∑
i=1
βiYt¡i + ut, (3)
Aut = Bεt, (4)
where Y 0
t = [gt,τt,yt,πt,rt]isa(5×1)vectorofthemacrovariablesintheorderofgovernment
expenditure, tax revenue, output, inﬂation, and interest rates.4 β0,t are deterministic terms
including a vector of intercepts, time trends, and an oil-shock dummy, and βi (i = 1,··· ,p)
are the matrices of coefﬁcients. ut are the error terms of the reduced form, and εt are the
4Watanabe et al. (2011) use VAR models with three variables, government expenditure, tax revenue, and
output and provide evidence that the government expenditure shock raised the GDP in the pre-bubble period.
4
2377Economics Bulletin, 2011, Vol. 31 no.3 pp. 2373-2387





1 0 agy agπ agr
0 1 aτy aτπ aτr
a31 a32 1 0 0
a41 a42 a43 1 0






























b11 0 0 0 0
b21 b22 0 0 0
0 0 b33 0 0
0 0 0 b44 0


























where we do not interpret the third to the ﬁfth shocks. Using the external information, we
identify agy, agπ, agr, aτy, aτπ, and aτr. Two output elasticities, agy and aτy, are taken from
Watanabe et al. (2011). Following Watanabe et al. (2011), we set agy = 0, because the
automatic response of govenment expenditure to output ﬂuctuations within a quarter is limited.
Furthermore, Morita (2011) discusses that implementation lags exist in Japan. aτy are set
at 0.189 and 0.141 in the pre- and post-bubble periods respectively.5 The price elasticity of
government spending depends on the decision of contracts: if the spending is ﬁxed in nominal
terms within a quarter, the elasticity is −1 and if it is based on real-good terms, the elasticity
becomes zero. Favero and Giavazzi (2007) and Perotti (2005, 2007) assume that agπ = −0.5 in
the U.S. case, which lies among those values. Following Kato (2003), however, we assume that
agπ = −1 because government spendings in Japan are generally ﬁxed in nominal terms.6 For
agr and aτr, we follow the assumptions in Favero and Giavazzi (2007) and Perotti (2005, 2007).
We assume that agr = aτr = 0, because property income is excluded in both expenditure and
revenue. The individual interest income may be related to the tax income. However, it may
take more than one quarter to increase the tax revenue. We take the value of aτπ from Kato
(2003).
The left 15 parameters are just identiﬁed because the estimated variance-covariance matrix
of the ﬁve-equation VAR innovations contains 15 different elements. Finally, we assume that
the second structural shock does not have an impact effect on government spending: b12 = 0.
3.2 Impulse Responses
The vector-moving-average representation of the VAR model can be easily derived. Equation
(3) can be written in a vector moving average form as
Yt = C(L)
¡1˜ ut, (6)
where C(L) ≡ (I −β1L−···−βpLp) and ˜ ut = β0,t +ut. Therefore in a more compact form,
it becomes
Yt = φt + ζεt, (7)
where φt ≡
β0,t
C(L) and ζ ≡ A−1B
C(L) . Given the estimates of the coefﬁcients and volatilities, we
can calculate the measures of impulse responses (hereafter IR) of selected macro variables to
structural shocks. This is done in the following steps. First, we generate a baseline simulation
5These values are relatively lower than those in the U.S. and other major OECD countries. Watanabe et al.
(2011) document three related facts. First, the annual-based elasticity offered by the Ministry of Finance is 1.1,
and there is a big discrepancy from the quarter-based elasticity. Second, the relative weights of income tax and
corporate tax became bigger, while those of indirect tax were lowered. Third, consumption tax was introduced in
1989: the elasticity of consumption is almost zero.
6We also re-estimate the VAR model with the value agπ = −0.5 and we have a similar result.
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for all variables by solving (3) dynamically forward. Second, we generate an alternative sim-
ulation by setting to one percent deviation of the structural shock, and dynamically solve the
model forward up to the same horizon used in the baseline simulation. Third, we compute IRs
to the structural shocks as the difference between the simulated values in the two steps above.
Fourth, we compute conﬁdence intervals by bootstrapping, for example.
3.3 VAR with debt feedback
Now, the VAR speciﬁcation includes the debt-to-GDP ratio (d) and the government intertem-
poral budget constraint:
Yt = β0,t +
p ∑
i=1
βiYt¡i + γdt¡1 + ut, (8)










Note that the identiﬁcation of structural shocks is not different from the standard VAR. No
parameter is to be estimated in the government budget constraint. However, we include the
feedback from public debt following Favero and Giavazzi (2007). This speciﬁcation is impor-
tant in analyzing the effect of ﬁscal policy shocks. Woodford (1998), Bohn (1998), and recently
Ito et al. (2011) have analyzed whether the ﬁscal policy is adopting a Ricardian behavior. If
the government is reacting to past debts and attempting to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio, the
feedback rule of government spending and revenue from the past level of the debt-to-GDP
ratio is expected. Furthermore, government spendings and revenues, interest rates, real GDP
growth, inﬂation are linked by the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. Debt dynam-
ics may inﬂuence interest rates and inﬂation. The relationship between debts and monetary
variables may reﬂect the policy-stance relationship between the monetary and ﬁscal authori-
ties. The debts accumulated in the past may inﬂuence output and other macro variables such
as consumption because debts have to be stabilized in the end. Therefore, it is important to
incorporate these relationships through the intertemporal government budget constraint.
4 Estimation and Benchmark Results
4.1 Data
We employ the quarterly data of ﬁve selected macro variables, and the sample period is 1970Q1
to 2004Q4. The series of government expenditure, tax revenue, and real GDP are taken from
Watanabe et al. (2011). These variables are seasonally adjusted and in per capita. For the
inﬂation data, we take the log differences of the seasonally adjusted GDP deﬂator downloaded
from the SNA database. We use interest rates and public debt data from Zaisei Kinyuu Tokei
Geppo (Ministry of Finance Statistics Monthly). We deﬁne government debts as the sum of
government bonds, ﬁnancing bills, borrowings, and temporary borrowings. However, the data
6
2379Economics Bulletin, 2011, Vol. 31 no.3 pp. 2373-2387
Figure 2: Actual and Simulated Debt-to-GDP Ratios








Notes: The blue line represents the actual data, and the green circled line represents the simulated data.
from Zaisei Kinyuu Tokei Geppo only covers the debts issued by the central government, and
hence, we collect data related to the local governments from the homepage of the Ministry of
Finance in Japan.7 For interest rates, we use the JGB yield.
Figure 2 compares the actual and simulated data. The simulated data of debts was con-
structed from the government budget constraint in equation (2), taking the actual value of debt
in 1970Q1 as an initial value, dt¡1. The simulated data closely traces the actual data. However,
some deviation is observed in the later period. This is probably due to the burden of social
transfers, such as pension beneﬁts, that is not considered in our model.
We split the total samples into two sub-sample periods: from 1970Q1 to 1986Q4 and from
1987Q1 to 2004Q4. The occurrence of the structural shift around 1987, the onset of the bub-
ble period, is often discussed in the existing works such as Jinushi et al (2000). This can be
criticised because of the degrees of freedom originating from the relatively short sub-sample
periods.8 However, we estimate two sub-sample periods because one of the main purposes in
our study is to compare our debt feedback rule VAR with the related preceeding literature. Four
lags are suggested by the Akaike information criterion in both of the sub-sample periods. The
VAR is estimated by using equation-by-equation least squares.
4.2 Activity of Fiscal Authority Stance
We start by interpreting the estimated coefﬁcients of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the VAR model.
Table 1 reports the results of the two sub-samples.
The estimated coefﬁcients of the debt to government expenditure and tax revenue reﬂect
how actively the government reacted to the past debt level in each sample period. In the pre-
bubbleperiod, weobserveasigﬁcantlypositiveresponseoftheprimarysurplustothepastdebt-
to-GDP ratio. In response to the previous debt level, the government increased tax revenues
and decreased its spendings to stabilize the economy. In particular, the stabilizing effect of
7Since only annual data related to the local governments is available, we assume that the share of the local
governments’ debts is constant.
8We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we seriously consider this problem. However, the local
government data is available since 1970Q1. We leave this issue on the future research.
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Table 1: Feedback from dt¡1
gt τt yt πt rt
1970Q1 - 1986Q4 - 0.280 0.757 -0.025 -0.135 0.001
(0.106) (0.167) (0.054) (0.038) (0.006)
1987Q1 - 2004Q4 0.098 0.051 0.067 0.049 0.002
(0.074) (0.203) (0.051) (0.019) (0.005)
Note: The standard errors are in parenthesis.
primary surplus on debts works mainly through the government’s response of increasing tax
revenue. This active stance of the ﬁscal authority leads to a negative but insigniﬁcant sign of
output. This is because the increase in tax revenues is linked to the negative wealth effects on
households.
In the second sub-sample period, there is no evidence supporting the argument that the gov-
ernment adopts a Ricardian behavior. The government’s spending had considerably increased
in response to the past debt-to-GDP ratio. The tax revenue had increased but not signiﬁcantly.
The expansion of government spendings is positively related to output. However, the volume
of the output is smaller than the primary deﬁcit volume. In all cases, the response of the interest
rates is positive but insigniﬁcant.
4.3 IRs in Each Subsample
In this subsection, we examine the effectiveness of the expansionary government spending
shock and the responsiveness of the ﬁscal policy to the need in ﬁnancing government expen-
diture. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the responses to government spending shocks in two
sub-sample periods: the pre-bubble period in the left column and post-bubble period in the
right column. For each period, we collect the IRs for the 20 periods of the horizons. The solid
blue and dashed grey lines indicate the estimated IRs and one standard-error bootstrapped con-
ﬁdence intervals, respectively, under the debt feedback rule. The red dash-dotted lines are the
estimated IRs of each variable under the no feedback rule.
We start by looking at the IRs under the feedback rule. As can be seen in the third row,
the expansionary government shocks are found to have positive effects on the GDP in the pre-
bubble period. However, these effects become insigniﬁcant in the post-bubble period, similar
to the ﬁndings in the preceding literature. More importantly, the expansion of government
spending leads to the increase of tax revenues in the pre-bubble period. This means that the
government increased taxes rather than issuing new debts during this period. However, this
Ricardian behavior of the government was not observed in the second sample period. In the
latter period, the government relied more on the debts to ﬁnance the expenditure in the latter
period.
8
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Figure 3: IRs with Feedback and No Feedback























































Note: The solid blue lines and shade areas indicate the estimated IRs and one standard-error bootstrapped
conﬁdence intervals, respectively, under the debt feedback rule. The red dash-dotted lines represent the estimated
IRs of each variable under the no feedback rule.
The IRs under the no feedback rule are generally the same as those in the debt feedback
case in both periods. In the case when we do not include the debt feedback, the effect of
expansionary government expending shocks on GDP is also positive in the short run. We
observe persistently positive effects of government expenditure shocks on inﬂation in both
periods. IRs of interest rates, which are the cost of servicing the debt, are positive.
However, there is one distinctive difference between two periods. Even in the pre-bubble
period, taxes were not increased greatly and they were even lowered in the ﬁrst four periods.
The government does not increase the tax revenue in response to its expenditures. In other
words, debts are issued to ﬁnance government expenditures. In the no-feedback rule case, the
positive effect on GDP is lower compared to the feedback case.
To discuss this difference between the two speciﬁcations in greater detail, Figure 4 displays
the IRs of debts. Under the feedback rule, expansionary government expenditure shocks boost
the economy so that the government could collect considerable tax revenues in the pre-bubble
9
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Figure 4: IRs of Public Debt














Note: The solid blue lines and shade areas indicate the estimated IRs and one standard-error bootstrapped
conﬁdence intervals, respectively, under the debt feedback rule. The red dash-dotted lines represent the estimated
IRs of each variable under the no feedback rule.
period. Therefore, the debts had reduced substantially. However, tax revenue responses are
negligible in the second sub-sample period. Thus, the debt responds positively. IRs under the
no feedback rule cannot capture this effect.
4.4 Debt Forecast
Figure 5 exhibits the debt forecast obtained from the intertemporal government budget con-
straint in the two sub-sample periods.
When we consider the feedback rule of debts, the expected path of debts in the out-of-
sample period is relatively stationary in the pre-bubble period. The Ricardian behavior of the
government stabilized the economy so that there was no extreme path of debt levels. This result
is consistent with that in Table 1. In the case of no feedback of debts, the forecast of the debt
path in the pre-bubble period shows a sharply negative path. This means that the government
is expected to become not a borrower but a saver with extremely positive wealth gains, which
is unrealistic.
10
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Figure 5: Debt Dynamics












Note: The blue lines represent the actual debt-to-GDP ratio path. The green dashed lines represent the forecast of
the debt-to-GDP ratio in the pre-bubble period. The red dash-dotted lines represent the forecast in the
post-bubble period.
A contradictory phenomenon is observed in the post-bubble period. The out-of-sample
simulation under the no feedback rule exhibits a considerably stabilized path of the debt-to-
GDP ratio. However, the debt path under the feedback rule diverges at a high speed. As
discussed in Table 1, in the second sub-sample period, the government had adopted a non-
Ricardian behavior so that the debt yielded an unstable path. However, the debt path under the
no feedback rule is relatively stable. Therefore, we can conclude that omitting a feedback rule
can result in very different paths for the debt-to-GDP ratio.
5 Robustness
For the robustness check, we carry out two alternative estimations. In the benchmark case, we
estimate the VAR model with a deterministic time trend. First, in our ﬁrst robustness check,
we re-estimate the model without a time trend. Second, as an explanatory variable, we use the
difference of the debt-to-GDP ratio rather than the past level. Overall, the results are the same
as those in the benchmark case. Therefore, we exhibit the coefﬁcients of debts. Tables 2 and 3
show the results of the ﬁrst and second robustness checks respectively.
In all cases, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence that the government adopts a Ricardian behavior in
the pre-bubble period. However, there is no evidence to support this phenomenon in the post-
bubble period. In most cases, the coefﬁcients for the government variables are not statistically
signiﬁcant in the latter period.
11
2384Economics Bulletin, 2011, Vol. 31 no.3 pp. 2373-2387
Table 2: Feedback from dt¡1 with no time trend
gt τt yt πt rt
1970Q1 - 1986Q4 - 0.160 0.503 0.010 -0.134 -0.003
(0.119) (0.161) (0.047) (0.032) (0.005)
1987Q1 - 2004Q4 -0.015 -0.048 0.004 -0.003 0.000
(0.011) (0.027) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001)
Note: The standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3: Feedback from ∆dt¡1
gt τt yt πt rt
1970Q1 - 1986Q4 0.419 0.856 -0.035 0.005 -0.030
(0.364) (0.656) (0.175) (0.142) (0.019)
1987Q1 - 2004Q4 -0.012 0.075 -0.056 -0.004 0.004
(0.079) (0.214) (0.054) (0.021) (0.006)
Note: The standard errors are in parentheses.
6 Concluding Remarks
Japan’s public debt level surged to more than 200 percent of the GDP in 2009, limiting the
government’s ability to spend more to revive growth. The rising debt-to-GDP ratio is a treat
for the Japanese economy. However, in the existing empirical papers with VAR models the
debt effect was not fully considered while estimating ﬁscal shocks. In this paper, we analyze
the effectiveness of the Japanese ﬁscal policy under the existence of debt feedback in the pre-
and post-bubble periods. In contrast to the previous VAR literature with no feedback of debts,
our model allows us to detect the changes in the ﬁscal policy mechanisms between two sample
periods.
Three main conclusions can be drawn from our analysis. First, the explicit inclusion of debt
feedback allows us to study how actively the ﬁscal authority responded to the past debt level. In
the pre-bubble period, the government actively tried to stabilize the debt level by increasing tax
revenues and decreasing government spending. On the other hand, the government increased
spending despite the high level of debts in the post-bubble period. Second, IRs on government
spending shocks support the ﬁrst ﬁnding: the Ricardian behavior of the government in the
pre-bubble period. In response to the exogenous government spending shocks, tax revenues
were raised signiﬁcantly. Although the interest payments increased, output and inﬂation also
increased. This reduced the burden of debt payments. The positive primary surplus also lowers
the volume of debts. However, we cannot ﬁnd this evidence under the no feedback rule. Third,
from the out-of-sample exercise, we ﬁnd that the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio under the
feedback rule were rather stable compared to the no feedback case in the pre-bubble period.
However, the dynamics of debt-to-GDP ratios are overestimated under the no feedback rule.
In the post-bubble period, the VAR model with debt feedback reveals that the government’s
stance on the debt level shows a very unstable path. It is underestimated under the no feedback
rule. Therefore, we conclude that the estimation of the VAR model without the inclusion of
debt feedback may result in the adoption of an unrealistic path of debt dynamics and a wrong
policy stance.
12
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